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Technical Efficiency of Rural Water Utilities
Arunava Bhattacharyya, Thomas R. Harris,
Rangesan Narayanan, and Kambiz Raffiee
Technical efficiency of rural water utilities is determined using frontier production functions.
An indirect  production function is developed to model the two-step production process of a
local  government-controlled  firm.  Data  from 26 rural  Nevada  water  utilities  are  used  to
estimate inefficiency  in terms of firm-specific variables., A multistep estimation  procedure
is used instead of single-step maximum likelihood estimation. Model selection tests are used
to choose the best model.  Privately owned  utilities are most efficient; self-governing  water
districts are the least efficient.  Municipal governments  operate the most and least  efficient
utilities.
Key  words: half-normal,  indirect  production  function,  model  selection  test,  normal-expo-
nential, rural  water utilities, stochastic frontier,  technical efficiency, truncated-normal
Introduction
Many rural citizens  cling  to principles  of Jeffersonian  democracy,  desiring provision and
control of community services at the local or small jurisdictional level.  However, Chicoine,
Deller,  and  Waltzer  argue  that  small-scale  operations  provided  by  local  jurisdictions,
particularly rural,  are inherently inefficient and costly.  Some studies indicate that structural
and  managerial  limitations,  in  addition  to federal  and state  government  mandates,  have
hampered  both  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of small  rural  governments  (Sokolow;
Seroka; Deller  1995).
Not only does small staff size make monitoring  and evaluating public-service provision
difficult, but often the distance separating these communities makes jointly providing public
services  impractical  (Cigler).  Given  local  budget  constraints  and federal  mandates,  effi-
ciency in providing public utility services  and commodities,  such as water,  is  imperative.
However,  little empirical  research  has examined  the  technical  (production)  efficiency  of
small  rural  governments  (Deller  1992).  This  study  attempts  to  determine  the  technical
efficiency of rural water utilities and to identify the most influential  factors.
Small rural government effectiveness can be evaluated with Inman's two-step decision-
making process, where the first step corresponds to provisionary decisions and the second
step refers  to production-related  decisions.  The  provisionary  effectiveness  addresses  the
local  officials'  ability  to develop  policies  to raise and allocate  necessary revenue  for the
production of various services. The production decisions refer to the purely technical process
of transforming inputs into public goods and services.  The second step of the process  is not
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independent of the first. Provisionary  decisions,  especially budget constraints,  affect pro-
duction decisions. Earlier  studies mainly look at production efficiency, independent of the
provision  decision  (Deller  and  Halstead;  Deller  and Nelson;  Deller  1992).  This  article
integrates both production and provision restrictions to address production  inefficiency of
rural water-supply  systems.
Since the 1977 publication of Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, the use of frontier functions
in estimating firm-level  technical  inefficiency has gained momentum. The error term of a
frontier production function  has two components:  one that allows for random error around
the  frontier, the  stochastic  element of the  frontier, and  the other for  one-sided  error, the
inefficiency  effect. The random error results from  factors  beyond the  firm's control,  for
example,  weather,  strikes,  and  damaged  products.  The  one-sided  error  term  measures
deviation of the observed production from the frontier production, which is under the control
of a firm. Therefore, the technical inefficiency under a frontier specification can be explained
in terms of firm differences.  We not only quantify the deviation of the observed production
from the  frontier production,  but we  also explain  the  deviation  in terms of firm-specific
variables.
Estimating  a  frontier  specification  requires  decomposing  residuals  of the  estimated
production function into white noise and technical  inefficiency effects. For this, the distri-
bution of the one-sided error term must be specified. Four different  distributional assump-
tions have been used in the frontier literature to specify the one-sided error term. These are
(a) truncated-normal, (b) exponential, (c) half-normal, and (d) gamma. The shape or position
of the estimated frontier may be affected by the choice of distribution (Stevenson). However,
few studies have attempted to statistically determine which particular distributional assump-
tion most closely follows the data-generating-process (DGP).' In this article, model selection
tests  are used  to select the distributional  form  for the one-sided  error term, closest to the
DGP.
Specifying  and estimating  standard frontier  models relies on  strong distributional  as-
sumptions about the error terms and their interrelationships.  We use a two-step estimation
procedure  to  minimize  the  need  for  strong  distributional  assumptions  (Kumbhakar  and
Hjalmarsson;  Heshmati  and  Kumbhakar).  Since technical  inefficiency  is under the firm's
control, it is likely that a model that explains technical  efficiency in terms of firm-specific
variables would have higher explanatory power. In this study, the likelihood dominance test
(Pollak and Wales)  is used to determine whether such a model has better explanatory power
than  a  standard  stochastic  frontier model.  If selected,  such a  model  can  directly  address
policy  issues  because  the  factors  influencing  the  firm's  level  of efficiency  can  also  be
identified.
Following  Averch  and  Johnson,  researchers  have  attempted  to  determine  ownership
effects  on the  efficiency  of privately  and  publicly  owned  utilities,  which  face  different
rate-of-return  regulations. It is often argued that private utilities overinvest in capital (capital
padding) to justify high rate of return or prices. Therefore,  in this study, private and public
utilities are treated differently.
Cowing, Reifschneider, and Stevenson and Reifschneider  and Stevenson  have examined and estimated inefficiency  under
different distributional assumptions.  Their results indicate a wide variation in the expected value of  the inefficiency disturbances
under different distributional assumptions.  However, no statistical test has been performed to compare the alternative models.
Recently,  Bhattacharyya,  Bhattacharyya,  and Kumbhakar have used model  selection tests to compare alternative models.
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Although extensive research has been done to examine and compare the performance  of
public and private utilities, little research investigates the possible differences  in efficiency
levels  among publicly  owned utilities,  their varying regulations  and  responsibilities,  and
their differing administrative structures and mode of operations.  This study examines these
possible differences. At least three types of public ownership can be found among rural water
utilities: municipal,  county, and special district-operated  water systems.  Given that munici-
palities and counties offer an array (or package) of  public services, competition among public
service providers may increase  efficiency and gain in economies of scope. On the contrary,
the special  district  water purveyors,  specialized  units with the primary  goal of supplying
water,  lack economies  of scope  resulting  from administering  an array of public  services.
This study explicitly introduces alternative ownership  effects into the empirical models.
Model
As explained  earlier,  the  supply  of local  public  goods  is  assumed  to  follow  a  two-step
process:  what  services  to  provide  and  how  to provide  them  cost-efficiently.  The  local
government's provisionary decision (first step) is assumed to set the maximum expenditure
for production of the sth public good or services,  that is, water supply system in this study.
In  the  second  step,  the utility  or the production  unit maximizes  output, y,  subject to the
expenditure  constraint.
The optimization problem  in the second step, therefore, is
(1)  maxy =  (X, Z),
(2)  s.t.:  C-W'X>0,
(3)  X2  >
where  y  es  9'  is  total  output;  W E A"+"  is  the  price  vector  of variable  factors:  X E 9t;
Z E-  SR  is  the vector  of quasi-fixed  inputs  and  control variables;  0,,  is  a  null  vector  of
dimension  n; and C is expenditure. The production technology of a utility is represented by
y = ®(.).  All constraints in the above problem are written in inequality form to allow for the
following possibilities: (a) the budget constraint may not be satisfied with equality, and (b)
the quantity of variable  inputs  is nonnegative.  Based  on the above criteria,  local officials
select the optimal level of inputs given the vector of variable factor prices (W) and quasi-fixed
factors and  control  variables  (Z).  Solving the first-order  conditions  yields  the  following
optimum  values  of  the  endogenous  variables:  X= X(W, C, Z),  X = A(W,  C, Z),  and
r  = G(W, C, Z), where  X and F  are the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (2)  and (3),
respectively. 2 Substituting  the  solution  of X into  (1),  the optimal  value of the  objective
function is obtained as:
(4)  y=  S'(W, C, Z).
2At  the  solution  point,  one  or more of the Lagrange  multipliers,  X and  F,  could be zero  indicating  that  the associated
constraint  is not binding.  However, we assume  that the Lagrange  multipliers are nonzero.
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Equation (4) is an indirect  production  function (IPF). With an IPF output is a function of
exogenous  variables-prices  of variable  inputs (W),  expenditure  (C), and  quasi-fixed
inputs  (Z). The  advantages  of such  an  IPF specification  are (a) it defines  the production
function of a water utility conditional on the provisionary decision taken by the organization
in  step one  of the decision-making  process;  (b)  the classic problem  of simultaneity bias
involved  in estimating a single-equation production function is avoided; and (c)  the impact
of change  in budget on production can be directly examined.
A natural measure of technical  inefficiency of a production unit is the Farrell's measure,
defined as deviation of the observed output from the "frontier" output level. A two-compo-
nent error term, defined  as e  = v-  ,  is appended  to (4). The error  component T captures
technical inefficiency of the representative water utility defined as deviation of the observed
output from the frontier output,  and v is  a random error term. The term T  is nonnegative,
that is, - > 0.  If-  r= 0,  the firm attains its production frontier which is stochastic due to the
presence of the white noise term v. The more realized production falls short of the stochastic
frontier, the greater is the level of technical  inefficiency.  The stochastic frontier IPF is
(4.1)  y= 3(W, C,Z)exp(s).
To impose a priori  minimum restrictions on the underlying technology and to allow for
Farrell's  measure  of technical  inefficiency,  a  short-run  IPF  for a  typical  water utility  is
approximated by a translog functional  form as:
(5)  Iny=ao +  a  ilnWZ  +  a.  lnZ  +aC  lnC+ - B  atlnW,  lnW
I I  !1 
2 Ill i=1  .=1  2  i=l  1=
11  InI
+ia  ,  In  /lnC+ojcIn  Z.InC+£.
i=l  .j=l
Symmetry and the homogeneity of degree zero in input prices are imposed on the IPF. The
symmetry condition requires
(,  i=  '  lic  a  j  =  a  j  ,  ic  =i,  ,  =a,  ,,  and  aoi.,  j  .
The homogeneity  condition requires
a,  + ao.  =0,  tia,  + a,  = 0  Vi  1,...,n,
i=l  /=1
t  a,  + a ,  =0,  j + a,  =0  Vj= 1..., m.
/=1  i=l
The specification of (5) with the imposed conditions captures technical inefficiency of a
water utility. The constant expenditure input demand function for the ith input can be derived
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from the  IPF using  Roy's identity,  that is,  X, = -((dy /  /W)l(Dy  / dC)).  This  enables  the
share of the ith input in total variable cost to be determined as:
a,  +  cialn W,  In  +  Ia  lnZ, +a,. lnC
a Inyv / a  In  C  ,
(6)  Si = - - v I  J=v  +  i,
Dlny/lnC  a,  +a,  lnC+  ia,  In W, +  cc lnZ
/i~  . j=
where  Si = WXi  / C,  and  ,  i is an additive error term. The numerator of a,  is the elasticity
of output with  respect  to the price  of the ith  variable  factor,  and  the denominator  is  the
elasticity of output with respect to the producer's budget.
Equations  (5) and  (6),  with symmetry  and homogeneity  conditions imposed,  define  a
complete  system of equations.  The  input price  vector  is  defined as  W = [W,  WL,  WM]',
where the subscripts, E, L, and M denote three variable factors: energy, labor, and materials,
respectively, that is, X = [XE,XL,X]' . The vector Z is defined as Z = [ZK,ZP,ZD ]',  where
the elements of  Z are capital (K), input-water (P), and density of population (D), respectively.
The budgeted  expenditure is defined as C =  E.  AX.
Rural water utilities  face different sets of regulations depending on their organizational
form. This difference in ownership forms may affect the decision-making  process of these
water utilities, and these effects can be captured by adding another additive term to the error
component of the stochastic translog IPF and the share equations.  Since it is reasonable  to
assume  that the ownership  effects are fixed across  firms with similar ownership structure,
these error components  are introduced as dummy variables for each ownership group in the
IPF. These ownership  attributes are  assumed known to the firm but are not observed by an
econometrician.
The  ownership-specific  dummy variables  are  introduced  in the IPF  in (5) as  follows.
Since  the  input-share  equations  are  derived  from  a  translog  IPF,  interactive  variable
DUM,, x In W is introduced  into the production  function, where DUM,, is a vector of the
ownership dummies, and t = 1,...,T indexes various ownership forms. Such a specification
imposes cross-equation  restrictions  on the fixed-effect parameters  between the production
function and the share equations. By doing so, the unobserved organizational characteristics
are  introduced not only in the IPF but also  in the share equations.  The term ya,  In W of
the production  function  in (5),  therefore,  is  replaced by Zi(a.  i  t,  UM)
and  the  parameter  a;  in  the  share  equation  (6)  is  replaced  by  the  term  (a,  +
T.l_  a,,DUM,  ).Given this specification, appropriate adding-up constraints must also be
imposed  on the fixed-effect parameters  as  a OW= - a Ot,, So  whether structural differ-
ences  exist  among  the  water  utilities  regarding  hiring  of variable  factors  due  to  the
differences  in ownership forms can be examined by testing the significance of  ,,  parame-
ters individually and/or jointly.
The primary goal of frontier methods is to identify inefficiency. A question of interest is
whether inefficiency occurs randomly across firms or whether some firms have predictably
higher inefficiency than others. If the occurrence of inefficiency is not totally random, then
it  should  be  possible  to  identify  factors  that  contribute  to  inefficiency.  Factors  causing
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deviation  from the  production  frontier  are  under  the  control  of the  firm.  The  level  of
inefficiency would likely be better explained in terms of firm-specific factors. These factors
are  incorporated directly in the model by specifying the inefficiency parameters in terms of
firm-specific variables.  Instead of assuming that E(-)  and  V(z-)  are invariant across firms,
as in the standard frontier specification, they become firm-specific  which allows estimating
inefficiency and explaining inefficiency  in terms of firm differences.
Let T be a function of a vector of firm-specific  variables,  Q e 9g, as:
(7)  T. =W(Q0.)lt
where  = 1,  ... , F  indexes firms,  t/ is a nonnegative random variable which captures part
of inefficiency,  and  Q includes the firm-specific  variables that explain the extent to which
the observed production level falls short of the corresponding stochastic frontier production
level. Detailed discussion of the specification of Q vector is provided later in equation (12)
and in the data section. Both t.  and v.  are assumed to have means and variances that are
invariant  across  firms,  that  is,  E(z  .)  =W(.)E(t,)  - v-(.)OA  and  V(T/)  =  (.)2V(t/)
t (.)2B.  Thus, xy (-) is firm-specific  and  A and B  are constants.  If X  (.) is a constant,  the
model reduces  to a regular stochastic  frontier (composed  error) model.  Therefore,  we can
statistically test both hypotheses with this specification.
Estimation
Since the number of parameters  to be estimated is greater than the number of available data
points,  a simultaneous-equation  estimation technique  is used rather than a single-equation
estimation method.  This increases the  number of effective  data points by the factor of the
number  of  additional  equations.  The  system  of equations  can  be  estimated  using  the
maximum likelihood (ML) method, and for that a set of assumptions regarding distribution
of the error terms y,  T, and  v  and their  interrelationships  are required.  Without loss of
generality,  these  models  can  be  estimated  in  two  steps  (Kumbhakar  and  Hjalmarsson;
Heshmati  and  Kumbhakar;  Bhattacharyya,  Kumbhakar,  and  Bhattacharyya).  First,  the
parameters  of the IPF  and  its  share equations  are estimated  simultaneously.  Second,  the
parameters associated with technical inefficiency are estimated conditional  on the parame-
ters  of the  production  function.  Given  all  estimated  parameters,  firm-specific  technical
inefficiency can be calculated as proposed by Jondrow et al. The advantage of this two-step
estimation method  lies in its  independence from a set of strong distributional  assumptions
regarding the error terms and their interrelationships.
Since  E(zc  ) = w (.)A,  the  production  function  in  (5)  is  extended by adding W  (.) to it.
Failure  to  include  vy  f(Q; P)  in the production  function  leads  to biased  and  inconsistent
parameter estimates, especially if the variables in the v  f.(Q;  3) function are not orthogonal
to those on the right-hand side of the production function. The resulting production function
is
3See  Battese  and Coelli  for the  advantage of such  a specification,  relative  to  that of running a  separate regression  of the
predicted  inefficiency  estimates on some firm-specific  variables.
At the first step of the two-step estimation process,  no distributional  assumption other than  zero mean and constant variance
is needed on  the error terms of the IPF and the share equations.  The error terms across equations are allowed to be correlated.
Distributional  assumptions on the one-sided error term  and the random error term are needed in the second  step for estimation
of the inefficiency  parameters.  In the case of a single-step  ML estimation, a set of strong assumptions are needed not only to
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(8)  lnyf =y(  W, Z, C, DUM,,;  a, a,  o)  +  ; p  )+  .,
where y.  (.) is the right-hand side of the translog IPF in (5) with homogeneity and symmetry
conditions imposed and ownership-specific  dummy variables included.
The error vector (e  ., i,, ) is assumed to have zero mean and constant variance-covariance
matrix and  is  independent across utilities. Since there are  (n - 1) independent input share
equations, one of them is dropped to avoid singularity of the variance-covariance  matrix of
the share equations. Thus,  we have  a system of nonlinear seemingly  unrelated regression
(NLSUR) equations, where the error terms are correlated across equations. The multivariate
normality assumption on the error vector is not made. Because ofheteroskedastic error terms,
parameter  estimates,  except  ac,  are  consistent  but  not  asymptotically  efficient.  Het-
eroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors are obtained using White's correction (White).5
Next,  the predicted  residuals,  B., of the production  function  are  obtained  using the
consistent  parameter  estimates,  a  and  a,  that  is,  excluding  at  and  setting  p = 0.  BP,
therefore,  contains all inefficiency factors  and white noise errors as:
(9)  Br =a,  + E  =a,  -W f(.)t1  + Vf.
At this  step,  distributional  assumptions  regarding  it.  and  v,  are  needed  to  develop  the
required log-likelihood function to obtain consistent estimates of the rest of the parameters.
Four different distributional assumptions have  been used in the literature for specifying
the one-sided  error term, it: (a) truncated-nonnal,  (b) half-normal, (c) exponential,  and (d)
gamma.  In  this  study,  instead  of  assuming  any  particular  distributional  structure  as  a
candidate for inefficiency  specification, the first three distributional  assumptions are tested
to determine which particular one follows  the DGP most closely.  Model  selection proce-
dures  for nonnested  models, as proposed by Vuong,  are used to determine  the appropriate
distribution for specifying the one-sided error term of  the translog IPF. However, for all three
distributional  specifications,  the random error part (vr) of the composed error is assumed
distributed normally with zero mean and constant variance, that is,  vf  i.i.di.  N(O, c  2 ).
The  most commonly used distributional  assumption  in the literature  for the one-sided
error term  ti  is  the half-normal,  that  is,  ti  is  independently  distributed,  such that  is  t.
obtained by truncation at zero of the normal  distribution with mean zero  and variance c 2.
Under a half-normal specification with normally distributed v ,  the log-likelihood function
for utilityf, following  Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt,  can be expressed as:
(10.1)  lnLHN  =A-  ln  . -2 .+ln  6f  -f
H2  'f  2(y  2o  J
CTl2l CT  2  1,V  [./.  ] where  } =c  2, +  (2  f = Wf (.) ,  /a ,,, E .= V  -T  = B  - a,  O  (.)  is the cumula-
5With  heteroskedasticity  the estimated  variance-covariance  matrix  is not consistent. The  White correction  (1980)  does not
alter the estimated parameters but provides a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance  matrix of the estimated parameters.
6A  gamma distribution  has mainly been  used  for deterministic frontier  specifications.  Gamma-exponential  (Greene  1990)
and gamma-normal  (Beckers  and Hammond)  models  have been theoretically  proposed,  but empirical  application  of either
stochastic  specification greatly  increases  the complexity of estimation procedure  (Greene  1993).  Moreover,  Ritter and Simar
show that there are other major problems in using a normal-gamma  frontier model.
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tive standard normal distribution function,  and A  is a constant which can be dropped from
the estimation.
Under  an  exponential  distribution  specification  of the  one-sided  error  term, t., with
v-  i. i. d. N(O, a 2), the log-likelihood function for utilityf; again following Aigner, Lovell,
and Schmidt,  can be expressed as:
(10.2)  InL  =-ln-  2+  In  (  - i  , lnLNE f - 2n(3/  .1  261
2  2  2 where  E(T.)  -=o  =\  (.)cI,  and  V(  1 c.)  =-  /. ()2  2
Stevenson  has argued that the zero mean assumption  in Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt is
an unnecessary restriction.  Instead,  the one-sided  error term tf can  be taken as a variable
obtained by truncating  the distribution  of a variable with possibly nonzero mean at zero.
Under  a  truncated  normal  specification  for  the  one-sided  error  term  t1 with
Vf  i. i. d. N(O, C 2  ), the log-likelihood function for utility fcan be expressed  as:
(10.3)  In L  -TN  . - In (  + In (  )
Maximizing each  log-likelihood  function  (10.1-10.3), summed  over all utilities,  gives
consistent  estimates  of the parameters  associated  with the  estimation  of technical  ineffi-
ciency, that is, a,,2,  2,  ,  I,  and  Pg.  Since B2  is not observed,  it is replaced  by:
(n  T-I1  n
(11)  Bf  = \ny-  l(ai  +  a o,iDUM,)ln ^I+l  ajIlnZi+a,  InC
i=l  (1  B 1 =l
· ,  ,  T-  m
i=  1  j  i=l  .j =
(  n  i11  I
which converges  in distribution to Bt  asymptotically  as (s  and a  are consistent estimators
of as (Griffiths and Anderson).
To incorporate  firm-specific  effects  in efficiency estimation, a linear function approxi-
mation of w/(Q,)  is used in estimation.  It is
(12)  V . =  I,  + I PL  InPL +  P  In SLW ID  + P ,  DUM
+PDDUM,  + P SDDUMSD + PMCPMC,
where PL is the total mile length of distribution pipelines; SL is the system  loss of water in
million of gallons; DUMas are dummy variables to capture differences  in sources of water
inputs; DUMr is a dummy variable that captures whether a water utility treats water before
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delivery; DUM,, is a dummy variable that accounts for a utility that only supplies water or
a  utility that also  treats sewer,  and PMC is  the percentage  of metered connection.  These
variables are discussed further in the data section.
If all  P  parameters associated with firm-specific  variables are zero and P,3  = 1, then the
half-normal and normal-exponential  models represent the corresponding  models specified
by  Aigner,  Lovell,  and  Schmidt.  Under  similar  conditions,  the  truncated-normal  model
reduces to the one specified by Stevenson.
Testsfbr Model Selection
Two  different  model  selection  tests  are  used  to  select  the  appropriate  model.  First,  the
likelihood dominance criterion (LDC)  is used to select between models with inefficiency
specification  in terms of (12),  that  is,  Model  A,  and the  standard  frontier  model, that  is,
Model B, under each of the three distributional  assumptions.7 Next, the Vuong test is used
to  select the appropriate model  from the two strictly nonnested models.  A sequential  test
process  is followed  to select among the competing models. That is, if the truncated-normal
model  (Model I)  is better than the normal-exponential  model (Model II),  and Model  II  is
found to be better than the half-normal  model (Model III), then Model I is chosen.  But in
the second test,  if Model  III turns out to be closer to the DGP than Model II,  then another
test is done between Model I and Model III to select the best of the three competing models.8
Likelihood  ratio  tests  to select  between  two  competing  models  can  be  conducted  by
evaluating the test statistic  ST = J[(F- 1) /F]  x t,.  In ST, t,  is the t-statistic of the regres-
sion of a series  of one,  { }, on m,, where  m, is the difference  between the log-likelihood
values of two models, for example, F0 and G,,  evaluated at each data point and F is the total
number of observations.  If the estimated test statistic  ST > C,  then the null hypothesis that
the two models are  equivalent  is rejected  in favor of F 0 being better than  G4,  where C is
the critical value from the standard normal distribution. If, on the other hand, ST < -C,  then
one  rejects the  null hypothesis  in favor of G, being better  than  F0. If ISTI< C,  then one
cannot discriminate between the two competing models given the data.
Efficiency Estimates
Given the parameter  estimates,  the i.i.d. component  of technical  inefficiency  can  be esti-
mated  for both distributional  assumptions from the conditional  mean of T  r  given  E  (T  r.)
or its mode (T /.).  For the truncated-normal  model the conditional  mean is
(13.1)  E[T  F',.  ]=T  -1*  +ST  2[F(1  1;)
and the mode is
7The LDC prefers Model A over Model  B if LB  - L,  < [C( Ni + 1) - C(  N,  + 1)] / 2; and Model  B is preferred over Model
A if LB- L,t > [C(  NB - N,  +  1) - C(1)] / 2,  where  L,  and  L. are  the values of the log-likelihoods  of Models  A and B,
respectively;  N,  and  N,  are  the number of respective  independent parameters  in  Models  A  and  B.; and  C(N)  is the critical
value of the chi-squared distribution  with N degrees of fieedom. If two hypotheses have  the same  number of parameters,  the
one with a larger likelihood value is preferred  in that case.
XTwo models F( and G,  are strictly nonnested,  if and only if F  n  G_  =  -).  Models I, II, and III are strictly nonnested because
each of them  follows a different  distributional  assumption  (Vuong, p. 317).
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(13.2)  A,  T  f>*,  if  i*20;
MrlI.r]-  1  0,  otherwise,
where 4(')  is the standard normal density  function.  Similarly,  for the normal-exponential
specification,  the conditional mean and mode, respectively,  can be expressed as:
(14.1)  E[T  ,/ If]  t  ]=T  o  +  ];
(14.2)  M[  ,.,  "  if A  > . 0;
0,  otherwise,
where  A.l  = (c 1 /  ,, - aV  / a  .).  For the half-normal specification, the conditional mean of
T  given  F  . is
(15.1)  E[^  / I]  =  =  +  ^  ];
and the mode is
A  i,  if1 >-  O; (15.2)  MAj  |.  IF] =  jll  =
f(15.2)  M[0,  ]  otherwise,
+6  2.202  /  21  +  2.)2 where  La /  =6 1}  1 / (1  + 8  ) and 8 = 6  }  / (1 + 6  )2.  An index of technical efficiency (TE)
is then estimated from:
A
(16)  TE1 = exp(-Ti),  and / or  TE/  = exp(-Tf).
The full-efficient utility has technical efficiency of 1.
Data
The data set used in this study was collected by surveying 26 rural Nevada water utilities in
1992. The water utility companies of rural Nevada differ greatly in size, composition, service
diversity,  water-input accessibility, and ownership form.  Descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used in the study are reported in table  1. Prior to estimation the data are normalized
such that the mean of each  variable  is one without affecting  shares  or other proportions.
Variable inputs are classed into three categories: energy (XE),  labor (XL), and materials  (XM);
measured  in  thousand  kilowatt  hours  (KHW),  labor  hours,  and  thousands  of dollars,
respectively.  Energy price (WE)  is obtained by dividing the total  energy cost by KWH of
energy used. The unit price of energy, therefore, includes all fixed costs (charges) associated
with energy use. The labor price (WL)  is calculated by dividing labor cost by the total hours
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Table  1.  Summary Statistics of the Variables
Variable  Description  Mean  SD
E  Energy (1,000  KWH)  460.49  669.69
L  Labor (1,000 hours)  6.09  6.34
M  Material costs ($ thousands)  26.88  39.26
WE  Energy price ($/1,000  KWH)  62.31  25.97
WL  Labor wage  ($/hour)  10.30  4.08
C  Total expenditure  ($  millions)  90.99  91.50
y  Water supplied (million gallons/year)  236.77  265.43
Zp  Water input (million gallons/year)  258.08  296.49
ZK  Capital ($  thousands)  1,346.90  1,587.00
ZD  Population/square  mile  1,163.10  2,889.10
PMC  Metered connections/total  connections  0.71  0.44
PL  Distribution pipe length (miles)  26.32  37.85
SL  System water loss (million gallons/year)  23.21  41.50
Numbers
DUM  = 1  Firms treating water  10
DUMsl  = I  Firms with surface water  13
DUMs2  = I  Firms with groundwater  6
DUMD = I  Firms with water and sewer  7
F  Total number of utilities  26
of labor used by a utility, assuming a total of 2,040 working hours per person in a year. For
materials,  defined as a composite  cost of all  materials used,  no price  data are available.
Assumed constant  across utilities,  materials  price  becomes  the numeraire  in estimation
(Eakin and Kniesner). Output (y) is the total water supplied in millions of gallons by a utility
(net of system loss) per year.
Wide  variations  across  utilities  are  observed  regarding  variable  inputs use and  their
prices. Variation  in energy use and its price is due to the following: (a) utilities'  operations
size,  (b)  volume  discount  on  energy  consumption  received  by  large  utilities,  and  (c)
water-input  sources.  A utility that uses groundwater usually consumes more energy com-
pared with a utility that draws from a mountain lake or spring. Variation in labor input price
may reflect local market conditions and the structure of the institution.  Some utilities in our
sample are very small and only hire part-time labor for some specific operations. As a result
their per hour wage rate  is low compared with a utility that hires full-time labor.
One major problem in a study of water utilities is how to account for the water input.
This  is one  of the most  important  inputs,  but pricing  owned-water  input (from  owned-
sources) is very difficult because there is usually no competitive market for that water. Some
researchers  like Ziegler  and Bell use a two-step method to determine the price of owned
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water, specifying a relationship between the expenses of self-supplied water and the quantity
of water.  Costs associated  with drawing water depend on the type of water-input  sources.
Some  studies  have attempted  to measure  the imputed value  (opportunity cost)  of owned
water and have used the price of purchased water as a price estimate (Teeples and Glyer).
Due  to the difficulties  associated with  obtaining data for  estimating  the imputed cost  of
owned  water  input,  Zp,  especially  for  the  rural  water utility  companies,  water  input  is
introduced as a control variable  in this study  following Feigenbaum and Teeples. The total
amount of water produced (million gallons) by and/or available to a firm for delivery during
a year is considered as water input.
In addition to water input (Zp), population density (ZD)  and capital  (ZK) are  introduced
as control variables. Since most water utilities are natural monopolies and by regulation they
must serve a given geographical  area, population density plays an important role in defining
their network  infrastructure.  Densely populated  areas require higher water pressure,  more
fire  hydrants, and frequent repairs and maintenance.  Population density  (ZD)  is defined as
the service population per square mile of an area served; capital (ZK) the current value of the
water utilities'  assets.
The variables used in the second step of estimation for explaining inefficiency of a utility
in Model A are DUMD, DUMs,  DUMs,  DUMT, PMC, InPL, and lnSL. This may not be
an exhaustive set to explain technical inefficiency, but technical inefficiency departure from
the frontier can be systematically explained in terms of the above set of variables. Technical
efficiency of a rural water service  may depend  on the size of operation and vintage  of the
infrastructure.  Total length of distribution pipelines (PL) is used as a measure of the size of
operation. The system loss variable (SL), the quantity of water loss in the distribution process
due  to  leakages  and  breakdowns  of pipelines,  is  introduced  to  capture  the  vintage  of
infrastructure.  There  would be  higher  system  loss  and  more  maintenance  the older  the
infrastructure becomes.  Thus, higher  system loss will  not only widen the gap between the
observed output and the frontier output but also would increase the water delivery cost.
The service quality depends partly on the product pricing structure. With metered water
service, customers  pay for blocks of water used and the rates are usually progressive.  The
administrative  cost  of metered  pricing  is  high  compared  to  flat-rate  pricing.  However,
Bhattacharyya  et al.,  show that metered  service  makes users conservation-conscious  and
makes  utilities  more  efficiency  conscious.  This  is  because  through  metering  the utility
becomes aware of leaks for early repair and possible areas of overcapacity. This in turn helps
a water utility to plan for a more efficient water distribution system. Moreover, the time and
cost  of reading  water  meters  induce  a  water  utility  to  process  the  water  consumption
information  to  improve  water use  efficiency.  The variable  PMC accounts  for these  firm
differences.  The PMC is the ratio of the numbers  of metered service  connections  to total
service connections.
The  water  delivery  cost  and  technology  depends  on  water  sources.  In  some  cases,
especially in mountain areas, water delivery cost from high altitude sources is low and little
maintenance  is required.  On the other hand, groundwater  requires not only lumpy invest-
ments to pump out water and carry it to any destination  but also requires frequent mainte-
nance.  Dummy  variables  DUMA  are  used  to  account  for  different  water  sources.  Three
possible  combinations  of sources  are:  only  surface,  only  ground,  and  both  surface  and
ground.  DUMS 2 = 1 if only surface source is used and zero otherwise, and DUMSl  = 1 if the
source  is  exclusively  groundwater  and  zero  otherwise.  If  a  utility  uses  both  sources,
DUMS 3 =  1 and zero otherwise.
Seven out of 26 sample firms not only supply water but also provide sewer services. This
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diversity of services  is likely to generate  economies of scope  for the firm.  Such a firm can
recycle  the  treated  waste  water  for  outdoor  watering.  The  same  set  of technical  and
administrative staff (except for some specialized  work) can maintain both facilities.  Firms
are controlled for such complementariness by introducing  a dummy variable DUMsD in the
x (Q; P)  function.  DUM5 equals  one  if the  utility provides  both  sewer  treatment  and
drinking water, and zero otherwise.  Finally, a dummy variable DUMT is included. DUMT =
1 if a utility treats water before  final delivery,  and it assumes a value of zero if the utility
does  not treat water input.  Treating water before  delivery improves the quality of service.
However,  it is costly and in some cases requires substantial investments. Whether treatment
improves a water utility technical  efficiency is an empirical question,  the sign and signifi-
cance of the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable DUMr would indicate that.
Results
The  parameter  estimates  obtained  from  the  first  step,  with heteroskedasticity  corrected
standard  errors,  are  reported  in table  2.  This part  is  common  for all  three  distributional
specifications  and is required for estimating inefficiency of the water utilities. Thirty out of
44 parameters are statistically significant at the 1  0% level. (Note that the intercept parameter,
a 0, is not reported in table 2 as it is estimated in the second step). These parameters are used
to estimate  Bf  using (11).  Table 3 reports  the ML estimates of the constant term, a,,, and
the  six  different  sets of parameter  estimates,  obtained  from  the  estimation  of the three
different log-likelihood functions (10.1-10.3) with and without the firm-specific variables.
In estimating all three specifications  of Model A, c 2 is normalized  to unity as it cannot be
identified along with the intercept term P  ,  in (12).
The LDC tests reject all three models without firm-specific variables,  that is, Model  Bs
in favor of Model As. Thus, models which explain inefficiency in terms of firm differences,
that is, Model As, are preferred. Next, we perform the Vuong test to select among Model As
the one that is closest to the DGP. Two classes of nonnested models are compared at a time.
First, the normal-exponential  model, Model IIA,  is compared with the half-normal  model,
Model IIIA.  The estimated test statistic is 1.43. Therefore, the model  selection test fails to
discriminate between the two models at even 90% level of confidence.  Similar comparison
is  done between the truncated-normal,  Model  IA, and the normal-exponential,  Model  IIA.
The estimated test statistic is 3.31, which rejects the Model IIA in favor of the Model  IA at
the 95% level of confidence. Next, Model IA is compared against Model IIIA. The estimated
test statistic  of 5.32 rejects the half-normal  specification  in favor of the truncated-normal
specification  at the 95%  level of confidence.  The nonnested  model selection tests indicate
that the truncated-normal  specification  is closest to the DGP out of the three distributional
specifications.
Since  the  LDC  model  selection  tests  preferred  Model  As  compared  to  Model  Bs,
efficiency estimates obtained under Model A are presented. Although the subsequent Vuong
tests selected  the truncated-normal  (IIIA) specification  over the normal-exponential  (IIA)
and  half-normal  (IIIA),  inefficiency  estimates  of all  three  A models  are  reported.  The
estimates of average technical efficiency evaluated at the mean and mode of all three models,
IA,  IIA,  and  IIIA,  are  shown by types of organization  in table 4. The  average efficiency
estimates from Model Bs are also provided.
Ideally, these estimates of technical efficiency should reflect the effects of cross-sectional
variability  in the data. For example, the variability of energy prices between utilities in the
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates of the Indirect Production Function of Rural Nevada  Water
Utilities
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Table 3.  Maximum Likelihood  Parameter Estimates under Alternative Distributional Specifi-
cations
Model
IA  IIA  IIIA  IB  IIB  IIIB































































- 0.0412  -0.1513  -0.1749















Note: Asymptotic standard  errors are in the parentheses.
Glossary: T-N  is truncated-normal;  N-Exp  is normal; H-N  is half-normal.
sample may be due to the volume discounting used by the large firms in their purchases of
energy. The lower energy prices may then be systematically directed  toward the large firms
and may also reflect higher efficiency (in addition to possible market power) on the part of
those large firms. This observation is consistent with the literature on the volume discounting
(Carlton and Perloff). A failure to accommodate the possible volume discounting effect from
purchases of energy may bias efficiency estimates against larger firms. Due to incomplete
information  on volume  discounting in energy  purchases by the large firms  in our sample,
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Table 4. Mean  Technical  Efficiency  of Water Utilities  by Ownership
T-N  Model  N-Exp Model  H-N Model
Utility  IA  IA  IIA  IIA  IIIA  IIIA
Group  Units  Mean  Mode  Mean  Mode  Mean  Mode
Private  2  0.9061  0.9130  0.8002  0.8002  0.7860  0.7860
(0.0233)  (0.0468)  (0.0714)  (0.0714)  (0.0605)  (0.0605)
County govt.  5'  0.8350  0.8666  0.7660  0.7678  0.7368  0.7368
(0.0937)  (0.0767)  (0.1019)  (0.1057)  (0.0751)  (0.0752)
Water  dist.  7  0.8569  0.8624  0.7653  0.7690  0.7436  0.7484
(0.0746)  (0.0834)  (0.1068)  (0.1152)  (0.1115)  (0.1228)
Municipality  12  0.8643  0.8956  0.7981  0.8028  0.7837  0.7872
(0.1133)  (0.1099)  (0.1249)  (0.1318)  (0.1212)  (0.1263)
Model A  26  0.8599  0.8824  0.7833  0.7868  0.7641  0.7670
(0.0934)  (0.0913)  (0.1084)  (0.1146)  (0.1048)  (0.1105)
Model  B  26  0.8763  0.8796  0.8028  0.8062  0.7928  0.7839
(0.0928)  (0.0928)  (0.1051)  (0.1109)  (0.0934)  (0.1130)
Note:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Glossary:  T-N  is truncated-normal;  N-Exp is normal-exponential;  H-N is half-normal.
Since model selection  tests preferred  Model  IA over the other two models, efficiency
estimates obtained from the truncated-normal specification (Model IA), reported in columns
3 and 4 of table 4, are used for discussion.  Parallel inferences  also can be drawn using the
efficiency  estimates obtained  from  the normal-exponential  (Model  IIA)  and half-normal
specifications  (Model IIIA),  as reported  in columns 5-6 and 7-8, respectively,  of table  4.
The modal estimates of technical efficiency, representing ML estimates (Jondrow et al.), are
used for interpreting the results. The average technical inefficiency  of rural Nevada water
utilities is  13.05%,  that is, on average they  are 88.24%  technically  efficient,  with highest
technical inefficiency 39.32%.
Among  different organizations,  the privately owned utilities are  most technically  effi-
cient, with average efficiency  91.3%  and a minimum of 88%.  Water utilities managed  by
water districts are most inefficient, with an average technical efficiency 85.65%, that is, they
produce  15.22% less than their frontier output level.  The maximum technical inefficiency
of district-operated units is 32.69%. Water utilities operated by county governments  are, on
average, almost  as inefficient  as the district-operated units, with average technical  ineffi-
ciency  14.62%,  and a range of 0.31%  to 23.22%.  The average technical efficiency  of the
municipality-operated water utilities is 90%, with estimated technical efficiency range from
67.49%  to  100%. Municipal  governments  own both the best and the worst efficient water
utilities.
Estimated  parameters  of the  \  (Q; P)  function  explain  inefficiency  in terms  of firm
differences.  The estimated  parameter  of PMC is  negative,  while  that of PL  is  positive,
indicating  that  increased  metered  connections  (PMC) increases  technical  efficiency,  and
bigger infrastructure  (PL) reduces technical  efficiency.  Because  the average PMC is 0.71,
technical efficiency may be raised by moving from a flat-rate system to a metered connection
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system. The estimated coefficient of system loss (SL) is positive under the truncated normal
specification;  therefore,  higher SL  would  increase  technical  inefficiency,  and  the sample
firms can  improve  their efficiency  level through better maintenance  of existing pipelines.
However,  the estimated parameter is not significant.
Parameter estimates of both source dummies,  P1 and P 2, are positive  and significant,
showing  that  firms relying  on a  single  source of water  input, either only surface  or only
ground, have higher technical inefficiency,  ceteris paribus, than firms who use both sources.
Firms that rely on surface water as their exclusive source of water input are technically  less
inefficient,  ceteris paribus, than firms who rely exclusively  on groundwater. The estimated
parameter of the treatment dummy,  PT,  is positive and significant, demonstrating  that the
water utilities that treat water before delivery are more technically inefficient than those that
do not.  As a negative  value of P D  indicates,  utilities that provide  both water supply and
sewer treatment  services are  technically  more  efficient than  the  ones supplying  drinking
water  only.  This  combination  of the  management  of sewer  treatment  and  water supply
facilities may improve technical efficiency for utilities.
Conclusion
Small rural  governments'  effectiveness  can be evaluated  with Inman's  two-step decision
making process, in which the first step corresponds to provisionary decisions and the second
step refers to production-related decisions.  Past studies of local government-owned  utilities
have  examined  production  efficiency  independent  of provisionary  decision.  This  study
incorporates  the  provisionary  decision  in  the  production  function,  through  an  indirect
production  function. Technical  efficiency of rural water utilities is determined using frontier
production functions. Previous studies have only distinguished  between private and public
utilities and have not considered the implications  of the differences  in ownership of public
utilities.  Here,  public  utilities  are  classified  into  three  ownership  forms:  (a)  municipal
government operated, (b) county government operated, and (c) water district operated units.
Model selection  tests are used to identify the form of the distribution for the one-sided error
term that follows the data generating process most closely.
Model  selection tests are also used to discriminate between the competing models which
explain  technical  efficiency,  with  and  without  firm-specific  variables.  Empirical  results
provide evidence  to choose  the models  in which  inefficiency parameters  are functions  of
firm-specific variables. The models with normal-exponential  and half-normal specifications
for the one-sided  error term are  inferior to the ones with a truncated-normal  specification.
Empirical  results  show  that  technical  efficiency  of the  water  utilities  in  rural  Nevada
averages 88.24%. The private firms are more efficient than the publicly owned water utilities.
Among three  different  types  of public  water utilities,  the  ones managed  solely  by water
districts  seem  to be the  least efficient.  Water utilities  run by  municipalities are found, on
average,  to be most efficient.
The following  advice can be provided  to rural water utilities to increase efficiency:  (a)
increase metering and consolidation of service area, (h) reduce water loss in the distribution
process,  (c)  combine  drinking water production and sewer treatment management,  and (d)
diversify  water-input  sources. Further  investigation  is  needed to understand  (a) the wide
variation  in the efficiency of the municipality-owned  units and (b) the higher inefficiency
of the units owned by water districts.
[Received January  1995; final version received October 1995.]
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